Prof. Joel Guttman

Prof. Joel Guttman
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Research interests: 
Political Economy, Public Economics, Economic Growth, Microfinance, Economics of Conflict, Social Norms, Endogenous Preferences, Evolution of Cooperation


Training and Professional Experience



Academic Degrees

B.A., with honors, University of Chicago, economics, 1974

M.A., University of Chicago, 1974, economics

Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1976, economics


Current Position

(1998-present) Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel


Visiting Positions

2003: Visiting Professor, Helsinki School of Economics

2002: Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Southern California

1998: Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Brown University

1998: Visiting Professor, Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago

1995: Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

1989-90: Olin Faculty Research Fellow, Yale Law School


Outside Professional Affiliation

2005-present: Senior Fellow, Networks Financial Institute


Previous Positions

1985-98: Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University

1983-85: Lecturer, Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University

1979-83: Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

1976-79: Acting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles


Consulting Experience

1976-80: RAND Corporation, Population Studies Project and Energy Project


Research Fields

Evolution of trust and cooperation, economic growth and conflict (internal and external), public economics, applied game theory, defense economics


Language Capabilities

Fluent in English and Hebrew


Awards and Honors

1988: International Fellowship, Institute for Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins University

1986: H.J. Heidekker Prize for Research in Applied Economics, University of Haifa

1974: Phi Beta Kappa


Publications and Reports

Ph.D. Dissertation: "The Demand for Publicly Financed Agricultural Research: An Application of a Theory of Collective Action," University of Chicago, August, 1976. Advisory committee: D. Gale Johnson (chairman), T.W. Schultz, Sam Peltzman, George Stigler



1. "Avoiding Specification Errors in Estimating the Value of Time," Transportation (1975) 19 42.

2. "Implicit Assumptions and Choices among Estimates of the Value of Time," Transportation Research Record, No. 534 (1975), 63-68.

3. "Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior," American Economic Association (Papers and Proceedings), 68 (May 1978) 251-255.

4. "Interest Groups and the Demand for Agricultural Research," Journal of Political Economy, 86 (June 1978) 467 484.

5. "Uncertainty, the Value of Time, and Transport Policy," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 13 (May 1979) 225 29.

6. "Villages as Interest Groups: The Demand for Agricultural Extension Services in India," Kyklos 33 (1980) 122 41.

7. "The Economics of Tenant Rights in Nineteenth Century Irish Agriculture," Economic Inquiry, 18 (July 1980) 408 424. Reprinted in Svetozar Pejovich, ed., The Economics of Property Rights, Volume 2: Property Rights and Economic Performance. Elgar Reference Collection. International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, vol. 129. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, pp. 520-36.

8. "The Political Economy of Agricultural Extension Services in India," in Public Choice and Rural Development, eds. C.S. Russell and N.K. Nicholson (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1981).

9. "Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context: Comment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 64 (November 1982) 781 782.

10. "Can Political Entrepreneurs Solve the Free Rider Problem?" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3 (1982) 357 366

11. "Endogenous Conjectural Variations in Oligopoly," (with Michael Miller) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 4 (1983) 249 264.

12. "Collective Action and the Supply of Campaign Contributions," European Journal of Political Economy, 1 (1985) 221 241.

13. "Cooperation and Part Time Farming in the Israeli Moshav," (with Nava Haruvi) American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68 (Feb. 1986) 77 87.

14. "Cooperation, Part Time Work, Capital, and Output in Moshavim," (with Nava Haruvi) (Hebrew) Israel Economic Quarterly 36 (1986) 602 615.

15. "Matching Behavior and Collective Action: Some Experimental Evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 7 (1986) 171 98.

16. "Uncertainty, Continuous Modal Split, and the Value of Travel Time in Israel," (with Eli Menashe) Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 20 (September 1986) 369 75.

17. "A Non Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action," Economica 54 (Feb.1987) 1 19.

18. "Strategic Work Interactions and the Kibbutz Kolkhoz Paradox," (with A. Schnytzer) Economic Journal 99 (September 1989), 686 99.

19. "Dynamic Optimization of Political Popularity in an Empirical Macroeconomic Model," (with Y. Shachmurove) Public Choice 66 (1990) 51 66. Hebrew version appeared in Investigations in the Israeli Economy 1988

20. "Voluntary Collective Action," in Markets and Politicians: Politicized Economic Choice, ed. A.L. Hillman (Boston, Dordrecht, and London: Kluwer, 1991).

21. "A Solution of the Externality Problem Using Strategic Matching," (with A. Schnytzer) Social Choice and Welfare 8 (1992) 73 88.

22. "Rent Seeking and Social Investment in Taste Change," (with S. Nitzan and U. Spiegel) Economics and Politics 4 (March, 1992) 31 42.

23. "The Credibility Game: Reputation and Rational Cooperation in a Changing Population," Journal of Comparative Economics 16 (December, 1992) 619-632.

24. "Voting as Investment vs. Voting as Consumption: New Evidence," (with N. Hilger and Y. Schachmurove) Kyklos 47 (May, 1994) 197-207.

25. "Rational Actors, Tit-for-Tat Types, and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 29 (1996) 27-56.

26. "The Explanatory Power of Game Theory in International Politics: Syrian-Israeli Crisis Interactions, 1951-87," Economics and Politics, 9 (March, 1997) 71-85.

27. "Unanimity and Majority Rule: A Reconsideration of the Calculus of Consent," European Journal of Political Economy, 14 (1998) 189-207

28. "On the Evolutionary Stability of Preferences for Reciprocity," European Journal of Political Economy, 16 (2000) 31-50

29. "Self-Enforcing Reciprocity Norms and Intergenerational Transfers: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Public Economics 81 (2001) 117-51.

30. "Families, Markets, and Self-Enforcing Reciprocity Norms," Annales d' Economie et de Statistique, 63-64 (2001) 89-110.

31. "Repeated Interaction and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity," Economic Journal, 113 (July, 2003), 631-56.

32. "On the Expansion of the Market and the Decline of the Family," (with N. Yacouel) Review of the Economics of the Household, 5 (March, 2007), 1-13.

33. "Assortative Matching, Adverse Selection, and Group Lending," Journal of Development Economics, 87 (2008), 51-56.

34. “On Revolt and Endogenous Economic Policy in Autocratic Regimes,” (with Rafael Reuveny) Public Choice, forthcoming. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-0012-3

35.“On the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation,” European Journal of Political Economy , 30 (2013) 15–34.


Refereeing Activities

  • American Economic Review,
  • Journal of Political Economy,
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics,
  • Economic Journal,
  • Journal of Law and Economics,
  • Economica, American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
  • Journal of Comparative Economics,
  • Journal of Development Economics,
  • Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
  • Journal of Public Economics,
  • Journal of Public Economic Theory,
  • Economics and Politics,
  • European Journal of Political Economy,
  • International Review of Economics and Finance,
  • International Journal of Business and Economics,
  • Rationality and Society,
  • Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie,
  • GIF (German-Israel Scientific Foundation),
  • Israel Science Foundation